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SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM INTERESTS:
CAPITAL STRUCTURE WITH MULTIPLE INVESTORS*
ERIK BERGLOF AND ERNST-LUDWIG VON THADDEN
We study the problem of financial contracting and renegotiation between a firm
and outside investors when the firm cannot commit to future payouts, but assets
can be contracted upon. We show that a capital structure with multiple investors
specializing in short-term and long-term claims is superior to a structure with only
one type of claim, because this hardens the incentives for the entrepreneur to
renegotiate the contract ex post. Depending on the parameters, the optimal capital
structure also differentiates between state-independent and state-dependent long-
term claims, which can be interpreted as long-term debt and equity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most firms have more than one investor and issue more than
one type of financial claim. These claims differ, among other
things, in maturity, payout contingencies, security interests, and
priority in bankruptcy. Investors usually specialize in particular
claims, e.g., by holding only short-term debt or only equity in a
firm. In case firms are financially distressed, short-term creditors
rarely forgive debt, while concessions often are made by subordi-
nated long-term claim-holders. This paper attempts to explain
these and other observations by asking how rational investors
design capital structure; i.e., how they allocate rights to returns
and what rules they specify to enforce these rights.
We study the problem of a firm seeking to raise capital against
the promise to pay investors back out of future returns. When
these returns are not verifiable in court, the promise must be made
credible. In practice, debt contracts often solve this problem by
giving investors, in case repayment promises are not met, the right
to liquidate or force the sale of assets that are easier to verify.
Typically, such assets exhibit a certain degree of firm specificity,
and hence are of less value outside the firm than for the generation
of future returns within the firm. Therefore, as emphasized by
Hart and Moore [1989, 1994], liquidation potentially hurts not
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only the firm, but also the investors and creates room for renegotia-
tions. This strengthens the firm's incentives to default strategi-
cally ex post, and thus weakens its commitment ability ex ante. We
analyze how the choice between one or more investors and the
allocation of liquidation rights and intertemporal return rights
between investors affect the ex post renegotiation.
We show that in general the firm will choose to have more than
one (class of) investor(s) and that investors separate their claims
across time and states of nature, with one investor holding secured
short-term claims and another junior long-term claims. If the firm
is doing well in the short run, the short-term creditor is repaid, and
long-term claim-holders receive all future returns. If the firm is
unable to repay in the short run, the short-term creditor forces the
firm to transfer or sell part of its assets. The maturity of her
remaining claims is extended at the expense of some (not necessar-
ily all) junior long-term claim-holders.
The principal reason for this separation is that the ex post
bargaining position of an investor with short-term claims is weaker
if she also has long-term claims because she internalizes the impact
of her actions on future revenues. On the other hand, separating
outside claims over time creates an externality on the side of the
short-term investor, which strengthens her bargaining power if the
firm should attempt to default. Separation of claims across high-
and low-cash-flow states—i.e., making long-term claims junior to
unpaid short-term debt—further discourages strategic default, by
giving the short-term investor an extra incentive to be tough with
the firm.
In some parameter constellations—when the investment is
sufficiently profitable or when the share of tangible assets in the
firm is sufficiently high—separation of claims across time and
states actually provides maximum deterrence from strategic de-
fault, namely zero rents from renegotiation. Therefore, not all
long-term claims are subordinated to unpaid short-term claims; in
addition to the state-contingent long-term claim, the optimal
capital structure contains a second, safe, long-term claim (a bond).
In the complementary set of parameters—when the investment is
less profitable—only two types of claims (short-term secured
claims and state-contingent long-term claims) are issued. In our
analysis the state-contingent long-term claim (equity) plays the
role of "strategic slack" in the spirit of Dewatripont and Tirole
[1994]: payouts are allocated to the firm and the short-term
creditor in order to optimize incentives, and the equity-holders
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balance the account. Our analysis goes beyond that of Dewatripont
and Tirole on this point, by introducing long-term debt (the
state-independent long-term claim) and characterizing the constel-
lations in which this additional claim will be optimally issued.
Our findings are consistent with recent empirical work on
bankruptcy and reorganization in the United States by Gilson,
John, and Lang [1990] and Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein
[1994]. These studies show how capital structure affects how firms
fare in financial distress. In particular, in their examination of
U. S. junk bond issuers, Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein show
that when companies are distressed, banks, who hold most of the
senior debt, virtually never forgive principal and rarely provide
refinancing outside of bankruptcy. However, extending maturity
on troubled loans is quite common (28 of the 76 cases in the
sample). Concessions, to the extent that they are given, come from
subordinated bondholders, typically through exchange offers. 1
Here, postponement, although it may reduce creditor returns to
some extent, is more favorable to senior debt-holders than forgive-
ness, because it comes at the expense of long-term claim-holders.
The theory developed in this paper predicts such postponement if
the firm is in financial distress, and predicts that it is accompanied
by asset sales and partial liquidations. Indeed, there is empirical
evidence that forced asset sales to pay off senior creditors are an
important feature of financial distress. The more commercial bank
debt a distressed firm has, the more likely it is that asset sales are
used to repay debt [Brown, James, and Mooradian 1993]. Our
analysis suggests that this emphasis of private debt-holders on
short-term goals, at the expense of subordinated long-term claim-
holders, may be desirable ex ante. It allows debtors to commit to
future payouts in a world where cash flows are difficult to verify. In
this respect, "short-termism" may be of strategic value.
The existing literature on default and bankruptcy usually
takes the allocation of claims as exogenous and derives implications
for liquidation, rescheduling of debt, and other issues at the
incidence of default, given this structure (for examples, see Bulow
and Shoven [1978], Gertner and Scharfstein [1991], and Franks
1. One of the main interests of Gilson, John, and Lang [1990] and Asquith,
Gertner, and Scharfstein [1994] is to compare informal reorganization and formal
bankruptcy as responses to financial distress. Our model does not allow for this
distinction: firms in our model survive financial distress, only the extent of
liquidation or forced asset sales in default is of interest. Incorporating the possibility
of bankruptcy in the present model, e.g., by letting first-period returns be
informative about future returns, is an interesting line of future research.
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and Nyborg [1993]. Building on the recent research on financial
contracting, we depart from this approach by emphasizing the
strategic relationship between short-term and long-term, and
between junior and senior, financial claims in the overall problem
of security design, i.e., at a stage of the interaction between firm
and investors where the parties consider default only one future
possibility.
Unlike previous work on capital structure, the security design
literature does not assume the existence of particular financial
instruments, such as debt and equity, but rather tries to generate
these instruments and combinations of them as optimal contracts
(for surveys of this literature see Harris and Raviv [1992] and Hart
[1993]).
The rationale for multiple outside investors holding different
financial claims has only recently begun to be explored. Williams
[1989] proposes a model in which company returns—as in our
model, though in a static setting—have a verifiable ("assets") and
an unverifiable ("cash") component, and the optimal contract
promises the (single) investor a fixed cash payment plus a fraction
of the assets. Zender [1991] shows how the traditional return
streams of fixed repayments and residual claims can arise endoge=
nously if investors are cash constrained. 2
Related work on the allocation of returns and control rights
among several investors is that of Diamond [1992]. As in the
present paper, short-term and long-term debt are held by different
investors, and short-term debt is senior to long-term debt. How-
ever, the existence of multiple investors is assumed rather than
explained, because different investors have different liquidation
abilities. Furthermore, as in Hart and Moore [1993], Diamond
assumes long-term investors to be dispersed, making renegotiation
more difficult. This assumption is not made in our paper.
Dewatripont and Tirole [1994] consider a model of capital
structure with multiple investors holding debt and equity. In their
analysis the firm's capital structure is designed to provide both
insiders and outsiders with incentive schemes. Managers are
2. More precisely, the capital structure in Zender [1991] consists of debt and
inside equity (as in Bergman and Callens's [1991] analysis of dynamic debt
renegotiation, there are only two players, one of whom obtains residual returns and
holds control).
Winton [1990], somewhat orthogonal to our approach, approaches the multi-
investor problem with a model of costly state verification. He generates a capital
structure with multiple investors holding instruments of different priority as a
means of economizing on verification costs.
SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM INTERESTS
	 1059
induced to maximize firm value, whereas outside investors are
given incentives to intervene when managerial compensation
schemes fail. Although this focus on incentives is different from
ours, their paper is similar in the identification of equity as a "soft
claim. "3
In work most closely related to ours, Bolton and Scharfstein
[1992] have studied the value of contracting with several creditors
in a model of contract renegotiation. 4 Their main argument is that,
when renegotiation is inefficient, e.g., because information is
asymmetrically distributed, two creditors may extract more cash
flows from the firm than one creditor. Our results extend to the
context of inefficient bargaining considered by Bolton and Scharf-
stein. In fact, the two articles complement each other. We demon-
strate why both short-term and long-term investors are desirable;
whereas Bolton and Scharfstein analyze when it is optimal to have
more than one short-term investor, and how liquidation rights
should be allocated among them.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
lays out the model. As a benchmark, Section III characterizes the
optimal contract with one investor. Section IV develops the analy-
sis of the two-investor case. Section V interprets the results,
generates predictions on the relationship between investment
profitability, debt maturity, and firm size, and relates these
predictions to the empirical literature. Section VI concludes.
II. THE MODEL
Consider a risk-neutral firm that has a profitable long-term
investment project, but not enough of its own funds to undertake
it. The project extends over three idealized time-points, t = 0,1,2.
In t = 0 the firm undertakes the investment, for which it has to
raise the amount I from outside. In t = 1 the firm's activities have
generated assets in place, A i , and cash flow, y i . Assets are measured
in physical units whose outside valuation, i.e., their resale market
price, is normalized to 1. In t = 1 all or parts of the assets can be
3. An interesting argument for the coexistence of debt and equity is that the
existence of debt can change the structure of possible negotiations between
managers/owners and third parties, such as suppliers or unions [Perotti and Spier
1993; Wells 1992]. While this argument is intriguing, it is difficult to imagine that,
in general, strategic considerations with respect to third parties are the driving force
behind the choice of capital structure.
4. In fact, to facilitate the comparison, our model formulation stays as close to
the framework used by Bolton and Scharfstein [1992] as possible.
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either liquidated or left in place for further use by the firm. If the
amount L,0 ^ L ^ A1 , is liquidated, the assets that remain in the
firm yield, in t = 2, a cash flow of y 2 (L) and a total of A.2 (L) of assets
in place. In t = 2 all cash flows and assets are consumed.
To keep matters simple, we assume that first-period assets are
certain. In other words, A l = A with certainty, and this is common
knowledge in t = 0. Long-term assets and cash flows may be
thought of as being uncertain (as of time t = 0 and t = 1), but since
they enter all considerations only via their expected values, we can
take them to be certain, as well. Hence, the functions A 2(-) and y2(.)
are deterministic and common knowledge in t = 0. Uncertainty
only prevails with respect to first-period cash flows y i , a random
variable whose distribution is given by
f 0 with probability 1 — 0,
y 1 = lx with probability 0.
Normalize the rate of interest to zero. We assume that the
project is worth the investment, i.e., that Ox + A 2(0) + y2(0) > I,
but that second-period assets A 2(0) are not sufficient to cover the
initial outlay: A2(0) < I. Obviously, if it were possible to write
binding, contingent contracts, the firm could easily attract one or
more outside investors (their number would be irrelevant) who
would be willing to put up I. However, in reality contracts are
binding only insofar as either they are self-enforcing or their
prescriptions are enforceable in court. The enforceability of repay-
ment claims by outside investors in turn depends on how easily and
to what extent courts can verify a firm's returns. Following Hart
and Moore [1989], we make the following
ASSUMPTION 1. y i and y2 accrue privately to the firm, and they are
observable by investors, but not verifiable by courts. A l and A2
are commonly observable and verifiable by courts.
For the sake of illustration we refer to the y t as "cash flows"
and to the At as "assets." These names reflect the observation that
it is usually much easier for owners or management to divert liquid
short-term funds for private use, perquisites, inefficient projects,
etc. than to do so with long-lived, illiquid assets. In reality, of
course, cash flows cannot be freely used by managers, and outsid-
ers may sometimes find it difficult to get ahold of some of the assets
when it comes to confiscation.
We will not distinguish between a firm and its owners or
managers, but just assume that "the firm" values cash flows and
assets. Given that A2(0) < I and the nonverifiability of cash flows,
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the firm therefore has to find a mechanism which persuades
potential financiers that it will pay out future cash flows. Securing
short-term claims with assets, together with the threat of their
liquidation, can provide this mechanism here. To formalize this, we
assume that the production function y2 (L) + L is decreasing in L;
i.e., a marginal unit of the assets yields more cash flow inside the
firm than what this unit is worth outside. The manager strictly
prefers to pay out liquid funds (if she has them), rather than
repudiate and have the investors take away some of her assets in t
= 1. In a narrow interpretation the assets thus earmarked for
possible liquidation can be viewed as collateral. More generally, any
contract that allows the investor to force asset sales or otherwise
intervene in case of nonrepayment has the flavor associated here
with "liquidation."
However, although both parties have an interest to agree to
such a punishment ex ante, ex post liquidation will be inefficient. If
y 1 = x and the firm defaults on its payments, both parties will be
better off if they rescind the original contract and replace it by a
new one with no liquidation and a cash payment by the firm, where
the payment depends on expected future returns from the project
and the bargaining situation after default. 5 When signing the
contract in t = 0, the parties will anticipate a renegotiation
following default in the good state rather than the mechanistic
liquidation of assets. Hence, in order to evaluate what the investors
can expect to receive in the good state, the parties have to forecast
the outcome of a bargaining game.
We assume that a contract can specify an amount Lakwhich
the investors are entitled to liquidate if the firm repays R. Yet,
actual liquidation and repayment following default, (L,R), are
determined through ex post bargaining. The investors' liquidation
rights L(R), however, determine the disagreement point in the
bargaining. This assumption describes a basic feature of debtor-
creditor negotiations, which take place in the shadow of bankruptcy
and under the constant threat that creditors call their loans.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that bargaining takes the
form of a take-it-or-leave-it payout offer by the firm. 6 Investors can
5. The point here is that the old contract is indeed legally invalidated by the
new one (which, in fact, is an important characteristic of bankruptcy law).
Otherwise the fact that some repayment has occurred could be used to prove that
the actual state has been good and hence the funds to repay the creditors are
available.
6. This is as in Aghion and Bolton [1992] and Bolton and Scharfstein [1992],
among others. It is not difficult to extend the analysis to more general bargaining
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accept this payment, in which case their old claims are invalidated,
or reject the offer, in which case they can exercise their liquidation
rights. As is standard, we assume that the investors accept a
take-it-or-leave-it offer about which they are indifferent.
Summarizing the above description, this is the sequence of
events in the model,
1. Parties write contract C; firm invests I.
2. First-period cash flow y i is realized.
3. Firm decides whether to default.
4. If firm defaults, renegotiation takes place.
5. A2 and y2 are realized. The end.
We shall ignore contracts that entail bargaining in t = 1 and
assume that the parties agree right away on liquidation and payout
schemes (LybRyi) that are renegotiation-proof. In the present
context a scheme (Lyi ,Ryi) is renegotiation-proof if the firm, given
y i , does not want to enter into the bargaining, but rather delivers
(Lyi ,Ryi). Since information at the bargaining stage is symmetric,
and thus the outcome of the bargaining fully predictable, this
assumption does not change the set of equilibrium outcomes.
Apart from providing for first-period transactions, the initial
contract must also specify how second-period assets A2 are divided
between the parties in t = 2. Because of the verifiability of A2 it is
irrelevant to whom A2 accrues in the first place, only the division
matters. We denote by W the share going to the firm, and by Si the
share of investor i. W and Si depend on (L,R).
We conclude the description of the model with a list of the
technical assumptions, some of which have been introduced al-
ready.
ASSUMPTION 2.
(1) A2 (A) = y2 (A) = 0
(2) A2(0) < I < A2(0) + y2(0) + Ox
(3) x y2(0)
(4) y'2 	—1
(5) —1 < A2 < 0.
games, as long as the firm has some bargaining power and information about y l
 is
symmetric (see Bergltif and von Thadden [1994]). As is well-known, the case of
asymmetric information is more complex [Gale and Hellwig 1989]. For an analysis
of the role of collateral in debt renegotiation under asymmetric information in a
one-period framework, see Bester [1994].
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Assumption 2(1) states that, if all the assets are liquidated in
t = 1, nothing is produced in t = 2. This is a normalization to
simplify notation. By 2(2) the project is worth the investment, but
long-term assets alone are not sufficient to finance it. Assumption
2(3) simplifies the exposition by guaranteeing that in the good state
the firm is not constrained by first-period cash flows. This assump-
tion could be relaxed at the expense of a more complicated analysis
with the same insights.? Assumption 2(4) states that the firm
prefers continuation to liquidation in t = 1, because each additional
unit of assets left inside the firm produces more than one unit of
long-term cash flow.8 As opposed to that, by 2(5) long-term asset
value increases less than on a one-to-one basis with short-term
assets. This is the case, for example, if assets are interpreted as
physical assets that are subject to depreciation: if A2 (L) = 8
(A — L) with 8 < 1, assets L liquidated today are worth more to the
investor than what he gets when he leaves the assets in the
company. Similarly, 2(5) holds if the firm's management has some
latitude to turn illiquid assets into nonverifiable cash flows in the
time period from t = 1 to t = 2.
By Assumptions 2(4) and 2(5), using the assets in the firm is
profitable in the long run, but at the margin the outside investors
cannot capture enough of long-term returns to make continuation
worthwhile for them alone; most of these returns stay within the
firm. This creates an ex post conflict of interest between the firm
and the outsiders that makes liquidation a credible threat.
III. CONTRACTING WITH ONE INVESTOR
As a benchmark, first consider the case where the firm
contracts with only one (class of) investor(s) to finance the
investment. In t = 0 the two parties have to sign a contract C =
(I + F, L•), Ro, R, W•), where Rk is repayment in state y i = in
t = 1, L(R) is the investor's liquidation right if payout in t = 1 is R,
W(L, R) is the firm's share of second-period assets, and I + F, F  0
is the amount of funds supplied by the investor in t = O. Note that if
F > 0, the firm has funds available in t = 1 even if yi = O. In this
simple setting of two states of nature, we can view Rx as the face
value and Ro as the default payment of debt.
7. See the discussion in footnote 11.
8. This assumption is a generalization of (*) in [Hart and Moore 1989] who
assume that y2 is linear with slope _^  —1. For the analysis of Sections III and IV to
be valid, one only needs to assume that the firm is overall profitable in the long run;
i.e., that y'2 + A'2 < —1. However, Assumption 2(4) yields a simpler interpretation of
the results obtained in Proposition 2. See footnote 18.
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Suppose that the firm, given y i = x, decides to default in stage
3, i.e., to make a repayment R R. By appropriately designing
L(•), we can assume without loss of generality that R = Ro. To
simplify notation, let Lo L(Ro), which is the value of the
investor's collateral.
In the ensuing renegotiation the parties bargain over possible
outcomes (L,R,T) E [0,A] x [0,x + F — Ro] x 1R, where L is
liquidation, R repayment, and T a transfer from the investor to the
firm in t = 2, supplementing or undoing the contractual payment
W. The disagreement outcome is (L 0,0,0), and the payoffs are
Firm: x + F — Ro — R + T + y2(L) + W(L,R 0 + R)
Investor: Ro + R — T + L + A2(L) — W(L,Ro + R).
By Assumption 2(3) and since R o _^  F, the firm is not cash
constrained. Since production is efficient (Assumption 2(4)-(5)),
the Coase Theorem implies that L = 0, regardless of W(•). Denote
the total gain from avoiding liquidation by
(1) II(L0) —= y2(0) — y2(L o) + A2(0) — A2(Lo) — Lo .
The firm's take-it-or-leave-it offer holds the investor down to
her liquidation value, and hence the bargaining yields the following
payoffs:
Firm: x + F — Ro + y2(L0) + W(Lo ,R0) + II(Lo)
Investor: R o + Lo + A2(L0) — W(Lo,R0)•
Now consider the possibility that the firm "defaults" following
y i = 0; i.e., that it repays Rx instead of R o . For this to occur, it would
be necessary that Rx F, which would imply that the investor does
not break even on her investment I + F, a contradiction. Hence, if
y i = 0, the firm repays R o, and the investor liquidates L o, which by
Assumption 2(5) is ex post optimal for the investor.
To simplify notation, let Wo
 = W(LoRo) and Wx = W(LX, Rx)
denote the firm's second-period compensation in the bad and the
good state, respectively. As of time t = 0 the principal data of the
contracting problem now can be summarized as follows. The firm's
expected profit from the venture is
P = (1 — 0)(F — R + y2(1
, 0) + Wo)
+ 0(x + F — Rx
 + y2(4) + Wx).
(2)
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The investor provides I + F if she expects to at least break even on
the investment; i.e., if
(3) (1 — 0)(Ro + Lo + A2(L0) — Wo)
+ 0(Rx + Lx + A2(Lx ) — Wx ) _ I + F.
The firm does not default in the good state in stage 3 if sticking to
the contract yields at least as much as the outcome of the
bargaining; i.e., if
(4) x + F — fix + y2(Lx) +147x  x + F — R o + y2(Lo) + Wo +11(4).
We will refer to (4) as the renegotiation-proofness constraint. 9
In the remainder of this section we characterize the optimal
contract. We start with some simple observations.
LEMMA 1. In an optimal contract, L o > 0, Rx — Ro — Wx < x, and
Lx = O. Furthermore, the participation constraint (3) and the
renegotiation-proofness constraint (4) bind.
Proof. Suppose that Lo = O. Then the renegotiation-proofness
constraint (4) reduces to Rx — Ro ^ y2(Lx) — y2(0) + Wx — Wo. This
implies for the expected return to the investor that
(1 — 0)(R 0 + A2(0) — Wo) + 0(Rx + Lx + A2(Lx ) — Wx )
< Ro + A2(0) — Wo < I + F
by Assumption 2(2). Hence without the threat of liquidation, the
investor cannot extract enough funds from the firm to cover her
initial investment. Next, since II(L 0) > 0, the renegotiation-
proofness constraint implies that
Rx — Ro — Wx _^  y2(Lx) — y2(L0) — II(L0) — Wo < y2(0) ^ x,
by Assumption 2(3). Next, suppose that L x > O. To see that this is
not optimal, reduce Lx marginally by A > 0 and increase R.— Ro -
Wx by (1 + A'2(4))A. This change leaves the investor's return (to
the first order) unchanged. Furthermore, y 2 (Lx) — Rx + Ro + Wx
increases marginally by — (A'2(Lx ) + y'2(Lx) + 1) A > 0, hence (4)
continues to hold, and P increases.
Finally, suppose that (4) does not bind. Consider the following
variation: reduce L o by a marginal A > 0, and increase R x — Ro —
Wx by (1 — 0)/0 (1 + A'2 (Lo)) 0. For small A this does not affect (4)
9. See Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1992] for a detailed discussion of the concept
of renegotiation-proofness in the context of incomplete contracts.
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and leaves the investor (to the first order) indifferent. P, however,
increases by – (1 – 0) (y 2(L 0) + AVL0) + 1)0 > 0.
QED
Lemma 1 simplifies the contracting problem considerably. Its
main assertion is that Rx – Wx < x + R 0 : the firm does not need all
short-term cash flows to meet its obligations in the first period.
This is important because, as the other observations show, the
. parties have an incentive to trade off liquidation against cash
flows—an increase in Rx – Ro – Wx
 compensated by a decrease in
liquidation rights is Pareto-improving. A priori, this trade-off is
limited by ex post opportunism (the renegotiation-proofness con-
straint) and available cash flows. Assumption 2(3), on which
Lemma 1 rests, assumes away this second limitation. As mentioned
in Section II, Assumption 2(3) could be relaxed without invalidat-
ing Lemma 1. 10
To solve the contracting problem, now insert the participation
constraint (3) into the firm's objective function to obtain
(5) P = (1 – 0) ( y 2 (L 0) + A2(L0) + L0) + 0(x + y2(0) + A2(0)) – I.
Hence, the transfers W0 and Wx
 , which cancel out, influence P at
most indirectly, via the renegotiation-proofness constraint. Simi-
larly, F and R0
 have no influence on the consolidated profit
function. Equation (5) shows that the only costs the firm must bear
apart from I are those of liquidation, which arise from the need to
punish its anticipated opportunism. Since liquidation is inefficient,
P is maximized if L0
 is minimized. The consolidated optimization
program therefore is
min L0(Lo,wo,F-Ro)
(P1) subject to 0 ^ L0 ^ A,	 W0 _ 0,	 F – R0
  0
(6) L0 + A2(L0) = I + W0 + F – R0 .
Here, (6) is obtained by inserting the renegotiation-proofness
constraint (4) into the participation constraint (3) and using
10. All one has to guarantee is that for the optimal Lo, x > Y2(0) — y2(Lo) —
II(L0). However, phrasing this in terms of the initial data of the problem is painful.
Yet, even if there were no assumption of this type, i.e., if first-period cash flows in
the good state were small as compared with second-period cash flows, the qualitative
features of the analysis would remain unchanged. In this case, first-period cash
flows would have to be paid out completely, there would be partial liquidation in the
good state, the renegotiation-proofness constraint would not bind, and the analysis
would become slightly more complicated. Assumption 2(3) allows us to make the
argument as simply as possible.
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Lemma 1. This formulation shows that the firm's compensation in
the good state is irrelevant for the solution of the contracting
problem. As long as feasibility, participation, and renegotiation-
proofness constraints are satisfied, the parties may set Wx at any
level they like. The reason for this indifference is simple: since W x
must de facto be paid out of the funds extracted from management
in t = 1, it cannot be effectively used to induce management to pay
out (things would be different if some effort had to be elicited from
the management after t = 1 as in Dewatripont and Tirole [1994]).
But for the same reason—the parties only consider net payout
Rx – Wx—a positive IV, is not distorting, either.
Hence, the parties are effectively concerned with setting an
optimal liquidation level Lo, with Rx determined by renegotiation-
proofness and Wo and F – Ro entering as adjustments to the
investor's participation constraint.
PROPOSITION 1. Problem (P i) has a solution iff
(7)	 Ã > I.
This solution is unique and has Wo = F – Ro = O.
Proof. The left-hand side of (6) is strictly increasing in L o by
Assumption 2(5). If (6) has a solution, it is unique and increasing in
Wo + F – Ro. Hence, optimally Wo = F – Ro = O.
QED
As was to be expected, in the optimal contract Wo = O. This is
because compensation in the bad state is basically a transfer a fond
perdu, which additionally sets the wrong incentives by rewarding
the firm for not paying out, and hence is viewed as an additional
cost of capital. Furthermore, up-front transfers F can be included
in the contract, but they are irrelevant, and they must be fully
neutralized; i.e., the payout in each state must increase by F.
Because liquidation rights can contractually be made contingent on
repayments, up-front payments do not affect the basic trade-off
between inefficient liquidation in bad cash flow states and leverage
to pay out in good cash flow states. If, for example, a contract
specifies a high Lo to force the firm to pay out when y i = x, this
amount will be liquidated in y i = 0, regardless of the up-front
transfer to the firm in the initial period. Therefore, the parties may
as well set F = 0 . 11
11. It is instructive to compare this setting with the corresponding model in
Hart and Moore [1989, Proposition 3]. There, contracts only specify face levels of
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Proposition 1 shows that if A 2(0) < A the problem of
insufficient long-term assets is overcome by pledging short-term
assets to make up for the deficiency. Since the firm is cash-
constrained in state y i = 0, the investor indeed liquidates the
amount Lo in the low cash-flow state. If the firm has sufficient
funds, it prefers to repay the investor to avoid liquidation of L o . But
since the investor would stand to lose the amount A 2(0) — A2(L0) of
future returns from liquidating, the firm's repayment is correspond-
ingly lower, namely, Rx = Lo — [A2(0) — A2(Lo )].
If A2(0) < I < A, the assets in period 1 are more valuable than
the original investment (the firm creates value added). If A < I, the
context is one in which the original investment depreciates. By (7),
such an investment cannot be financed by a single investor.
IV. CONTRACTING WITH TWO INVESTORS
Suppose that the firm considers having its project financed by
two (classes of) outside investors. The financial contract now must
allocate payout and liquidation rights to these two outsiders. As in
the last section, liquidation rights cannot be made contingent on
the state of nature y i , but only on payouts.
To keep the analysis simple, we assume that investor i's
liquidation rights only depend on the payout made to her. In
particular, if the firm defaults on both investors, repaying only R
and R2 , respectively, instead of the contractual payment, investor
i's liquidation right is D(Ri), independent of Ri, j i. In a strict
interpretation, this contractual setting corresponds to the case of
secured debt in the framework of debt collection law: each investor
has a lien on some portion of the firm's assets and is allowed to
foreclose her security interests if the debtor defaults on the
obligation to her. In practice, bankruptcy law, as opposed to debt
collection law, implies that one investor's liquidation rights some-
times depend on more complex considerations. 12 However, for the
present simple analysis the above assumption is no restriction.
short-term debt, which the creditor can unilaterally reduce after observation of y i ,
together with unconditional liquidation rights. Hart and Moore show that the
optimal contract typically involves a positive up-front transfer, because this credibly
reduces the creditor's incentives to liquidate in low cash flow states. Given that she
cannot commit to low liquidation levels, it is strictly optimal to use this instrument.
12. If we restrict attention to secured claims, both debt collection and
bankruptcy law in most countries share the feature that is fundamental to our
analysis: if the debtor does not repay the creditor, the creditor is entitled to assets,
liquidation proceeds, or other payments from the debtor, at least up to the amount
of collateralization. In the United States this holds for all the relevant chapters of
the Bankruptcy Code (7,11,13).
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As discussed in the last section, we can assume that the
investors provide exactly I in t = O. Unlike the one-investor case,
the parties here also must determine how to split second-period
assets, conditional on first-period events. Hence, the initial con-
tract must specify the following variables:
I': contribution of investor i,
R1 i*• repayment obligation to i in state y i in t = 1,Y
1, 1 (.): amount of assets i can liquidate if she receives
Ri in t = 1,
S i(.): investor is share of assets in t = 2 if first-period
liquidation is (L 1 ,L2 ),
for i = 1,2. 13 The Si have to satisfy the feasibility condition,
(8) S l(L 1 ,L 2) s2( .1, 1 ,L2\ =) A2(L 1
Let us now consider in more detail the default and renegotia-
tion game that the firm can trigger in t = 1. Suppose that the firm
defaults, against one or both of the investors, following the cash
flow realization y i . In principle, this can have two consequences.
Either, all three parties come together to renegotiate ("bank-
ruptcy"), or only one investor negotiates with the firm ("debt
collection"). This latter constellation occurs if and only if one
investor prefers to negotiate, the other investor prefers to stay out
of the renegotiation, and the investor who stays out of the
renegotiation does not liquidate assets if the firm is not cash-
constrained. If a contract were structured such that this last
condition were not met, given the overall optimality of keeping the
assets in place, the parties would get together ex post to upset the
contract. We describe both cases in turn."
To begin with, note that in state y i = 0 we necessarily have
R 1 = 1V0- = R2 = 14= 0 and liquidation of 4, g (remember that by
13. As in the last section, it is straightforward to see that the firm's share W of
second-period assets should be zero. Hence, we ignore this variable here. Also it is
clear that conditioning second-period results only on LI, L 2 , and not on Li, L2 , Ri , R2
is no loss of generality.
14. In this paper we do not attempt to answer the question whether the default
and renegotiation procedures of stages 3-4 are optimal from an ex ante bankruptcy
design perspective (see Harris and Raviv [1991] and Aghion, Hart, and Moore [1992]
for recent work on this problem). We simply intend to capture some basic features of
existing debtor-creditor law. An interesting modification of the present structure—
introducing a feature of debt collection law—is to drop the assumption of unanimity
in the trilateral bargaining game described below. This modification would not
change the main arguments, but would entail an analysis of the second derivatives
of long-term returns, as in Bolton and Scharfstein [1992].
+ L 2)	 for all L L 2 .
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Assumption 2(5) liquidation is ex post optimal from the point of
view of the investors). The interesting case is default in the good
state ("strategic default").
Suppose that the firm defaults, and both investors negotiate
with the firm. As in Section III, we can assume that R 1 = R2 = 0,
and to simplify notation we again denote by Lio -a--- Li(0), i = 1,2, the
value of i's liquidation rights.
In three-party bargaining, the firm has some opportunity to
force the investors into mutual concessions. To capture this, we
assume that if one participant rejects an offer, negotiations break
down and both investors proceed to liquidate. Hence, the firm only
has to offer each investor her reservation value resulting from total
liquidation. Since liquidation is inefficient (Assumption 2(4)), the
firm's take-it-or-leave-it offer is a triple (R 1 ,R2,T), where T is a
possible transfer from investor 2 to investor 1. Keeping the
investors indifferent between liquidating and accepting the offer
requires setting
R1 + T + S 1(0,0) = L4 + si(Ll,,rig)
(9) R2 - T+ S 2(0 ,0) = Lg + s2u,4,0.
By adding up (9) and using (8), the payoffs resulting from
three-party bargaining then are
Firm: x + y2(L0) + II(L0)
(10) Investor 1: LI) + Sl(L4,L g)
Investor 2: L g + S 2(L4,L g),
where II(L0), again, is the social surplus from renegotiation as
defined in (1), and L o = 4 + Lg denotes total potential liquidation
(total collateral). Note that in (10) the transfer T cancels out.
Regardless of the distribution of liquidation rights, the firm can
secure the same renegotiation rent as in the one-investor case, (2).
Now suppose that following default only one investor, say
investor 1, negotiates with the firm. The resulting bargaining game
r(L4, x - R2) between investor 1 and the firm is as in Section III.
The cash flow to be bargained over is either x — fq (in case of
partial default) or x (in case of total default). The firm and the
investor bargain over possible outcomes (L,R), where L is liquida-
tion and R is payout by the firm. The disagreement outcome is
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(4,0), and payoffs are
Firm: x — R 2 — R + y2 (L )
Investor 1: R + L + Sl(L,0).
The firm's take-it-or-leave-it offer maximizes its own payoff
subject to the constraint that the investor gets at least LI, +
(40). Clearly, this constraint binds. Hence,
(11) R = Sl(L4,0) — Sl(L,0) + L4 — L.
By designing the SqL,O) appropriately, we can restrict atten-
tion to L E t0,L41. Since the firm cannot be forced to get less than its
liquidation payoff in the bargaining, any outcome must satisfy
(12) x —	 — R + Y2(L) _ x — R 2 + y2(1,4).
Consolidating (11) and (12) shows that the bargaining will result in
L = 0 if
(13) S1(0,0) — S 1 (L 4,0) — L4 + y 2(0) — y2(L4)	 0,
and in L = L4 otherwise. Condition (13) states that the bilateral
surplus from avoiding liquidation is positive: it is a condition on the
contractually determined future returns to investor 1. If (13) is
violated, the contract is structured such that firm and investor 1
find it in their joint interest to liquidate. Given the overall
profitability of continuing without liquidation, this must come at
the expense of the second investor who will therefore not stay out
of the negotiations. When considering the case of bilateral bargain-
ing, it is therefore necessary to restrict attention to contracts
satisfying (13). Default and bilateral renegotiation then result in
the following payoffs:
Firm: x — R 2
 + y2(4) + Il i (L
(14) Investor 1: L 4 + S	 4,0)
Investor 2: R 2 + S 2(0,0),
where the bilateral renegotiation rent II 1
 is
(15) HA) = y2(0) — y2(L4) + S 1 (0,0) — Sl(L 4,0) — L4
= n(L4) + s 2(L4,o) - s2(o,o).
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By (14) and (15) the firm's payoff from renegotiation with
investor 1, for a given value of LI,, is smaller than in the
one-investor case if S 2(4,0) < S2(0,0). Since by renegotiation-
proofness in the good state the firm will pay out more the less it
stands to gain from default, optimal contracts minimize the firm's
renegotiation payoff. The following lemma characterizes contracts
that minimize this payoff.
LEMMA 2. Suppose that aggregate liquidation rights L o are fixed.
Any contract that minimizes the firm's payoff from bilateral
bargaining with investor 1 has Lg = 0. Furthermore,
(16) if II(L0) ^ A2(0), it has S 2(0,0) — S 2(L4,0) = 11(L 0);
(17) and if 11(Lo) > A2(0), then S 2(0,0) = A2(0), S 2(/)c-,,O) = 0.
Proof From (13), (14), and (15), minimizing the renegotiation
payoff is equivalent to finding nonnegative numbers L4, y =--
S2 (40), and z -s- S2(0,0),
(18)
0 < 1, o < Lo ,
0 ^ y ^ A2(1.4),
0 _^
 z ^
 A2(0),
z — y ^
 IRO,
which minimize
y — z — (A2(41) + 14.
Increasing L, ) does not change the admissibility conditions (18) for
y and z, hence, by Assumption 2(5), L4 = L o . Depending on which
inequality in (18) binds, we then get either (16) or (17).
QED
Lemma 2 shows the principal effect at work if default leads to
bilateral bargaining. The contract should display a maximum
degree of asymmetry in the temporal structure of return claims.
This is achieved by two distinct features. First, asymmetry be-
tween investors should be maximal, in the sense that all short-term
liquidation rights should lie with one investor (14 = 0 in the case
considered in Lemma 2). In this case, we shall call investor 2 the
long-term investor, and investor 1 the short-term investor.
Second, the asymmetry between the short-term investor's
long-term returns in the different states should be maximal. To
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make this clear, denote the minimal feasible difference between the
long-term investor's long-term returns (z — y in the proof of
Lemma 2) by
2 II(L0) if II(L o) _^  A2(0)0) ((19) A(L0) S(0, — S 2 L0,0) = A2(0) if II(L0) A2(0).
When the short-term investor bargains with the firm in strategic
default, he should not only have maximal leverage (Vo- = Lo), but
also his incentive to drive the firm into liquidation should be
maximal. For this, his long-term returns after liquidation,
S 1(4,0), should be as large, and those after repayment, S 1(0,0), as
small as possible, which is achieved by setting Sl(L4,0) — S 1 (0,0) =
A2( L4) — A2(0) +
Lemma 2 shows that, depending on the aggregate level of
liquidation, Lo, this second asymmetry can be strong enough to
completely eliminate all gains from renegotiation; i.e., achieve
= 0 (if (16) holds), but need not (if (17) holds). Certainly,
however, the firm's renegotiation payoff from bilateral bargaining
can be made smaller than that from trilateral bargaining. Hence,
ex ante a contract with maximal asymmetry between investors is in
all parties' interest. 15
To see whether this arrangement is also upheld ex post, note
that the long-term investor's payoff from not joining the renegotia-
tion is S2(0,0), while that from joining is S 2(L0,0) = S2(0,0) — A(L0).
In fact, the long-term investor would stand to lose from trilateral
bargaining to the benefit of the firm. However, staying out of the
renegotiation (e.g., by making herself unavailable) hurts neither
herself nor the short-term investor, because her refusal does not
trigger liquidation, and the short-term investor's interest to negoti-
ate ensures efficient continuation. 16
The complete determination of the optimal contract is now
straightforward. Since the long-term investor has no short-term
liquidation rights, her short-term claims must be zero, too. The
15. Note that this is true as long as the firm captures a positive part of the total
surplus from renegotiation (and not only if it captures the whole surplus, as
assumed here)..
16. This mechanism does not work if there is only one investor. If a single
investor does not want to renegotiate following default, this ultimately triggers
liquidation. Anticipating this, she renegotiates. Liquidation can be threatened
credibly if an investor is objectively unable to renegotiate; e.g., because "the
investor" is actually a whole class of widely dispersed claim-holders with no
provisions to overcome the free-rider problem [Grossman and Hart 1980]. It is
well-known that such a structure has desirable commitment properties. Our
analysis is concerned with situations without such commitment mechanisms.
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equilibrium payout Rx in the good state then satisfies the following
renegotiation-proofness constraint:
x — .1?! + y2(0) x + y2(L0) + 11 1 (L0),
where, as in Lemma 1, L x = 0 (no liquidation if there is payout).
Again from Lemma 1, the renegotiation-proofness constraint
binds, yielding
(20) R! = y2(0) — y2(L0) — (11(L0) — A(Lo)).
The ex ante expected returns to the two investors from this
contract are, respectively,
(1 — 0)(L0 + S 1 (L0,0)) + O(R! + S 1 (0,0)),
(1 — 0)S 2(L0,0) + 0S 2(0,0),
which can be consolidated, using (20), to give total expected return
to investors as
E(L0) Lo + A2(L0) + 0A(L0).
Since investors are assumed to make zero expected profits, the
optimal amount of liquidation rights in the two-investor case is
now given by
(21) E(L'0`) = I.
In order to solve (21) and to compare it with the corresponding
one-investor condition (5), note that II(L 0) is strictly increasing in
L0: the higher the liquidation right, the higher the gain from
avoiding liquidation. This implies that there is at most one solution
0 ^ L ^ Ato the equation II(L) = A2(0). By Assumption 2(4), there
is exactly one such solution. Hence,
11(L0)	 if Lo 	L
A(11°)
	A2 (0) if Lo > L.
It follows that E(•) is continuous (though not differentiable) and
strictly increasing for 0 L0 A, and the solution to (21) is
unique.
Depending on I, the short-term repayment is now determined
by (20), the long-term claims by (16), (17), and (8). Lemma 2
indicates that we can distinguish two cases, which we formulate as
Propositions 2 and 3.
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PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that
(22) E + A2(L) + 0A2(0)  I.
Then for any D E [0,A2(0) – 1-1(4)1, the following capital
structure is optimal:
(WS)
L4 = 14 ,	 Lg = 0,
R1= y2(0) – y2(L:),	 R! = 0,
S 1(0,0) = D,	 S2(0,0) = A2(0) – D,
Sl(L: ,0) = y2(0) – y2(4) – /4 + D, S 2(14 ,0) = A 2(0) – 11(4) – D,
where L : is given by (21). Along the equilibrium path, these are the
only optimal capital structures.
Note that uniqueness only holds along the equilibrium path;
off the equilibrium—i.e., if (L 1 ,R 1) 
 (40), (0,RD—the schedules
L•), S 1(•), S2(•) are not unique.
Before discussing Proposition 2, we first continue the charac-
terization of optimal capital structure. Two observations, however,
are worth being pointed out immediately. First, if condition (22)
holds, the optimal capital structure has one degree of freedom. It
only exhibits a weak separation of claims over time: while investor
2 only holds long-term claims, the short-term investor can also
hold fixed claims D on long-term returns in both states. Second,
since the firm's renegotiation rent is eliminated, the structure
(WS) is second-best optimal: if an investor could commit to
liquidating an amount L o , she could not do better than (WS). Both
these features vanish if (22) ceases to hold.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that
(23) E + A2(L) + 0A2(0) < I _^ . A + 0A2(0).
Then the following capital structure is the unique optimum to the
contracting problem:
LI, = L (1, ,	 Lg = 0,
Rl =A2(4)+14, R! = 0,
(SS)	 si(0,0)= 0,	 s2(0,0) = A2(0),
s1(L4,0) = A2(4),	 s2(4.,0)= 0.
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In (SS), separation of claims is strict: the short-term investor
has no claims on long-term assets in the good state. As in
Proposition 2, uniqueness clearly only holds along the equilibrium
path. Note that by Assumption 2(5), the right-hand side of (23) is
indeed not smaller than the left-hand side. Finally, note that if both
(22) and (23) are violated, the project cannot be financed even by
including two investors. 17
The main characteristic of the contracts derived in Proposi-
tions 2 and 3 is that they drive a wedge between short-term and
long-term investor interests. This creates an externality on the side
of the short-term investor that reduces the firm's rents from
bargaining if it attempts to renege on the contract ex post. As
pointed out earlier, this externality indeed persists ex post, because
it is not in the long-term investor's interest to join the renegotia-
tion and because the short-term investor's presence ensures
efficient continuation.
To conclude the analysis, we briefly show that the optimal
contract is also stable against collusion among two of the three
parties involved. Consider first the scope for ex post side-
contracting between the two investors. Since the value of the
long-term investor's claims is affected by liquidation, is she willing
to pay the short-term investor for not liquidating L o in t = 1? Such
cooperation is not profitable for the very reason that the single
investor in the one-investor case has an ex post incentive to
liquidate: because A '2 > —1 (Assumption 2(5)), paying the short-
term investor to reduce liquidation would cost the long-term
investor more than she would gain from the increase in the value of
long-term assets.
Judging from the legal and the earlier economics literature,
the coalition involving the firm and the short-term investor is
potentially the most serious problem in practice. The standard
argument here is that the two parties could use the opportunity of
bilateral bankruptcy negotiations to hurt the long-term investor
through excessive liquidation. But, again, in the present context
there is no such incentive. Not only does the firm care more about
marginal long-term returns than the outsiders (A'2 > y'2 by Assump-
17. The whole analysis remains valid if one relaxes Assumption 2(4) to y 2 +
A'2 < —1. Now, for S 1(4,0) to be nonnegative, the restriction on D in Proposition 2
must be strengthened to max {0,4 + y2 (Li) — y2(0)} D _^  A2(0) — 1-1(4). Hence,
if L: + y2 (Li) > y2(0) not enough short-term cash flow can be extracted from the
firm, and the short-term investor takes a long-term stake to compensate for this
shortfall.
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tions 2(4), (5), but, since yi2 < — 1, liquidation is outright inefficient
from the firm's perspective. Hence, if the short-term investor
wanted to bribe the firm in the good state to fake bankruptcy, he
would have to put up more in cash than he would receive in asset
value.
V. INVESTMENT SIZE, DEBT MATURITY, AND COLLATERALIZATION
In this section we review some features of the optimal contract
identified in the last section in less technical terms and provide
some results on comparative statics. We start by analyzing how the
optimal capital structure depends on the relative size of the
investment, I. Variations in I, with all other project characteristics
held fixed, change the project's profitability, and are therefore
similar to, e.g., changes in the project's long-term returns y 2 or A2.
Using Propositions 2 and 3, we can distinguish three different
regions of /, ceteris paribus.
If < A2(0), i.e., if investment is small relative to the verifiable
long-term returns it generates, then all repayments can be made
out of A2, there is no short-term debt, and hence no short-term
default. The firm only issues safe long-term claims with face value
D = I.
If / increases beyond A 2(0), claims on short-term returns must
be issued to make the project viable. In the range A 2(0) < I < +
A2(L) + 9A2(0), the optimal capital structure has one investor
holding short-term debt with face value R.1
 and partially backed by
liquidation rights L4. Although default is possible (and happens
with probability 1 — 0), short-term debt is = /1 — D is riskless,
because the amount outstanding after default, R1 — L4, is essen-
tially rescheduled and repaid in t = 2. The other investor contrib-
utes le = 00(4) and holds a state-contingent long-term claim.
Finally, the optimal security issue includes safe long-term claims of
face value Il ---= A2(0) — II(L:), held by any or both of the investors.
Note that the fixed long-term claims serve no strategic pur-
pose. In the derivation of the optimal contract, they arise as a
residual: even without them, the short-term investor has maxi-
mum leverage over the firm, and the other investor is sufficient to
absorb the balance. Hence, a contract in which these claims are
held by a third investor does as well as one where they are held by
one or both of the two investors.
If the investment requires more than L  A2(L) + 0A2(0), fixed
long-term claims are no longer optimal. In the parameter region
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given in Proposition 3, the only long-term claim issued by the firm
is state-contingent, paying A 2(0) in the good and 0 in the bad state.
An increase of I beyond A + 9A2(0), the project's "finance
capacity," makes it impossible to finance the project. Yet, the
project's finance capacity is larger than its first-period asset
liquidation-value A, which is what can be raised by finance through
a single investor (see Proposition 1). For example, if first-period
assets are assumed to be just the initial investment reduced by
depreciation, one has A < I, and exclusive finance is not viable at
all. However, so long as the assets do not depreciate too fast
(I A + 8 A2(0)), the project can be financed by two investors. The
difference between the finance capacities with one and two inves-
tors indicates how much more of its expected future returns the
firm can credibly commit to pay out in a two-investor arrangement.
The claims identified above resemble the standard financial
instruments of short-term debt, senior long-term debt, and equity
(or junior long-term debt). One difference, however, which arises
from the simplifying structure of the model, should be noted
immediately. In the present model, all uncertainty is resolved at
time t = 1, and therefore, the contingency of second-period returns
refers to first-period events. To obtain a fuller analogy to observed
financial instruments, the model would have to be generalized to
allow for second-period uncertainty as well.
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Moreover, it describes how two indicators of the relative impor-
tance of short-term debt depend on I, the share of short-term debt
in the overall issue and the ratio of short-term debt to equity.
PROPOSITION 4. The optimal capital structure can consist of three
types of claims: fixed long-term claims, state-contingent long-
term claims, and collateralized short-term claims. If / A2(0),
only fixed long-term claims are issued, and if / + A2 (L) +
9A2(0), no fixed long-term claims are issued.
The share of short-term debt in the overall issue, IS is
increasing in I. If A2 and y2 exhibit nonincreasing returns to
scale, the ratio of short-term debt to equity, IS is increasing
in I.
Proof. From (21)
dL:  1
dl = 1 + A '2(L0) + OA' (Lo) •
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For both (22) and (23) it is then straightforward to check that d I dI
(Is II) > O. If (23) holds, /s/P = /s/(0A2(0)), which is increasing in
Lo , hence in I. If (22) holds,
d IS 0
clg
.
 le — (Ie 2) R—A(L)tflait) (Y2(0) Y2(— — g )) (1Tg )i,
which is positive if y 2 and A2 are concave.
Figure I summarizes how capital structure changes QED with
decreasing profitability of the investment (increasing I). We do not
know of any empirical studies that provide evidence on the
relationship between short-term indebtedness and profitability,
predicted to be negative. The prediction about IS is consistent
with Titman and Wessels [1988], who for a sample of 469 Compu-
stat firms from 1974 to 1982 report a strong and significant
negative correlation between profitability and the ratio of short-
term debt levels to market values of equity. 18
By Propositions 2 and 3, short-term indebtedness Rx and
liquidation rights L4 comove with increasing I. Hence, the impact
on the degree of collateralization of short-term debt, 4/Rx, is a
priori indeterminate. Indeed, it is easily seen that the relationship
need not be monotonic. However, when capital requirements are
larger, namely if (23) holds, collateralization is always increasing in
I. If the project's finance capacity is reached, Lo = A, and
collateralization is 100 percent. 19
We conclude this section by modifying the model of the
previous sections slightly, to provide some insight into how the
financing decision is affected by the structure of long-term returns.
Let f(L), 0 _^  L _^  A, f < —1, denote the total long-term returns of
a project, divided into private returns y 2 of and public returns
A2 ( 1 — a)f, 0 < a < 1. Assumptions 2(4)—(5) then read —1/a
f' > —11(1— a). By varying a (within these bounds), we can
analyze how changes in the composition of long-term returns affect
the optimal capital structure. Lower a's then correspond to a
greater degree of tangibility of long-term returns.
18. The findings by Titman and Wessels [1988] must be taken cum grano salis.
In particular, they find that the ratio of short-term debt to the book value of equity
is more or less uncorrelated with profitability.
19. For Germany the study by Drukarczyk, Duttle, and Rieger [1985] finds
that the average degree of collateralization for small- and medium-sized loans is 70
percent and that the key determinants for lowering collateral requirements by
banks are project profitability and management quality.
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FIGURE I
PROPOSITION 5. The more of total long-term returns is nonverifi-
able (i.e., the larger a), the larger is the share of short-term
debt in the optimal capital structure.
The proof of Proposition 5 is straightforward. The proposition
directly reflects the strategic role of short-term debt in our theory:
the less investors expect to participate in the long-term returns of
the firm, the more they use short-term leverage to make the firm
pay out funds earlier on. This is consistent with the empirical
findings on asset tangibility and debt maturity for small U. S. firms
as reported by Hart and Moore [19941.2°
A broader view obtains if one interprets a as indicative of the
size of the firm in the present simple model. In this interpretation
small firms are characterized by a relatively high degree of owner
discretion and few established control structures, which make
returns less readily available to outsiders. Hence, their a is larger.
For larger firms with better established control structures and a
broader asset base, on the other hand, it is more difficult to divert
returns from outsiders; these firms are thus characterized by a
20. Data from several surveys by the U. S. National Federation of Independent
Business in the 1980s.
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smaller a. This interpretation is consistent with the empirical
findings by Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn [1992] and Rajan and
Zingales [1994] . 21
Under this hypothesis, Proposition 5 rationalizes the well-
known empirical regularity that short-term indebtedness de-
creases with firm size, found in several flow-of-funds statistics. For
example, Gertler and Gilchrist [1994] report for the U. S. manufac-
turing sector (data for 1986) that the share of short-term debt in
overall debt declines from 29 percent for small firms (assets < $50
million) to 13 percent for large firms (assets > $1 billion). Federal
Flow of Funds Statistics for Germany [Deutsche Bundesbank
1985], which reports the full balance sheet, shows a short-term
debt/asset ratio of 55.9 percent for small firms (assets < DM 25
million), declining to 39.5 percent for large firms (assets > DM 25
million).
VI. CONCLUSION
This article further develops the bargaining-based theory of
capital structure pioneered by Hart and Moore [1989, 1991], and
Bolton and Scharfstein [1992]. According to this theory, the firm's
capital structure influences potential future negotiations between
the firm and its investors, and the anticipation of such negotia-
tions, in turn, influences financial decisions. The choice of financial
contracts is determined as a trade-off between, on the one hand,
the desire to discourage ex post renegotiation (strategic default),
and on the other hand, the wish to limit inefficient liquidation
when the firm is cash-constrained (liquidity default). This trade-off
determines endogenously an optimal cost of financial distress. We
demonstrate how investors by separating their claims across time
and states of nature can reduce the need for inefficient liquidation
in liquidity default while maintaining the disincentives of strategic
default. As a result, the firm can reduce its cost of capital and
increase its finance capacity.
The whole analysis has been conducted under the assumption
that the firm has all the bargaining power in ex post renegotiation.
This is an extreme case, since it holds the investors down to their
liquidation payoffs and thus the scope for ex post opportunism on
the side of the firm is particularly large. Still, the analysis
21. Rajan and Zingales [1994) do not report a regression of firm size on
tangibility (only comovements in joint regressions). However, Rajan [1994], using
these data, confirms the correlation.
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demonstrates a systematic difference between the commitment
possibilities with one or more investors. It is easy to show that that
this systematic difference persists under more general allocations
of bargaining power; i.e., when the firm's ex post opportunism is
more restricted. 22
Like Bolton and Scharfstein, we emphasize the role of techno-
logical factors, or more precisely the effect of liquidation on
production, in ex post bargaining. We derive predictions for how
these factors affect the choice of debt maturity, the debt-equity
mix, and the degree of collateralization. To focus our analysis, we
have largely ignored the impact of outside influences on the
bargaining problem by assuming the outside valuation of firm
assets to be constant. However, our analysis is easily extended to
show that, for example, firms with readily redeployable assets, i.e.,
with high liquidation values, have a higher finance capacity than
firms with highly specific assets (cf. Williamson [1988]). Similarly,
if the firm has more than one type of verifiable asset, the most
attractive collateral for short-term debt are assets with high
liquidation values that depreciate quickly (see BerglOf and von
Thadden [1994]).
The importance of liquidation values has been emphasized by
Shleifer and Vishny [1992], who have argued that the costs of
financial distress vary over the business cycle and according to
industry-specific factors. In recessions, when asset markets often
are relatively illiquid and liquidation values consequently low, the
costs of financial distress are higher. In boom periods, liquidity
shocks are more likely to be specific to a particular firm and do not
affect alternative users of liquidated assets. As a result, the costs of
inefficient liquidation are smaller. As argued by Shleifer and
Vishny, these cyclical variations will affect a firm's debt capacity,
and, we argue, more generally a firm's capital structure.
Conversely, as illustrated by Asquith, Gertner, and Scharf-
stein [1994], capital structure has an important impact on how
firms can deal with (cyclical or firm-specific) financial distress.
They show that while underperforming firms are more likely to get
into financial distress, it is not necessarily a firm's long-term
profitability, but rather its capital structure that determines how it
fares once in distress. A better understanding of this interrelation-
22. Only when the firm has no bargaining power ex post is capital structure
irrelevant. In this case, outside investors can extract all ex post surplus from the
firm by assumption, and devices to improve extraction are not needed. See Bergltif
and von Thadden [1994].
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ship between capital structure and short-term performance may
help explain findings such as those by Gertler and Gilchrist [1994]
that smaller and medium-sized firms in the United States with
their strong dependence on short-term bank finance and limited
access to capital markets are much more affected than larger firms
by business cycle-related fluctuations. As our comparative statics
results show, corporate finance may help to shed light on these
macroeconomic issues.
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